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Abstract
Background—During the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, household transmission studies
were implemented to understand better the characteristics of the transmission of the novel virus in
a confined setting.
Methods—We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to assess and summarize the
findings of these studies. We identified 27 articles, around half of which reported studies
conducted in May and June 2009.
Results—In 13 of the 27 studies (48%) that collected respiratory specimens from household
contacts, point estimates of the risk of secondary infection ranged from 3 to 38%, with substantial
heterogeneity. Meta-regression analyses revealed that a part of the heterogeneity reflected varying
case ascertainment and study designs. The estimates of symptomatic secondary infection risk,
based on 20 studies identifying febrile acute respiratory illness among household contacts, also
showed substantial variability, with point estimates ranging from 4% to 37%.
Conclusions—Transmission of the 2009 pandemic virus in households appeared to vary in
different countries and settings, with differences in estimates of the secondary infection risk also
partly due to differences in study designs.
In 2009 influenza A (H1N1-2009) virus (abbreviated as pH1N1) emerged to cause the first
influenza pandemic of the 21st Century.1 Many epidemiologic studies were carried out to
characterize the epidemiology of pH1N1 and inform decisions about possible
countermeasures. Of particular early interest was the frequency of transmission from
confirmed cases to their close contacts. The household, defined as a person or a group of
people living in the same residence, provides a strategic setting to track infections among
close contacts of cases: one, the denominator is well-defined, and two, household contacts
can generally be identified and followed with fewer resources than other types of contacts. It
is also strategic to monitor transmission in households where up to 30% of influenza virus
transmission is believed to occur.2,3
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A substantial fraction of influenza infections are asymptomatic or associated with mild
disease that does not require medical attention. Epidemiologic studies of severe cases (e.g.
hospitalized cases) can provide detailed information on the risk factors of death and thus
help examine the prognosis and clinical effectiveness of treatments among the severe
fraction of cases. However, studies in households can observe the full range of illness
associated with influenza, as well as examining transmission in a confined setting.4 In a
confined setting, one way to quantify the overall risk of infection (which may be used as a
relative measurement of the transmissibility of an influenza virus), is to estimate the
proportion of susceptible household contacts of an index case who subsequently become
infected.5 The conditional risk of infection in households given exposure to an index case
can be estimated overall, or compared among subgroups (e.g. children vs adults), or between
persons who did or did not receive specific interventions such as antiviral prophylaxis.6,7
The clinical onset serial interval (defined as the time from illness onset of an index case to
illness onset of a secondary case infected by the index case8) offers insight into the natural
history of influenza and is key to interpretation of the early growth of cases using
mathematical modeling techniques.9 Estimates of the mean serial interval in households are
often regarded as a proxy for the average time between successive host generations of
infection in a population,9 although the applicability of household results to other settings is
still subject to clarification.
Timely household studies can be highly informative.10 The household secondary infection
risk (SIR), more commonly referred to as the secondary attack rate (SAR), represents an
overall risk of infection among household contacts for a defined time period. Throughout
this paper we use SIR, because (1) the household outcome of our interest is not necessarily
best referred to as an attack in that many influenza infections are mild and (2) rate is a
misnomer and the SIR is a measure of risk under certain assumptions5 (see Methods section
below). Here we report a systematic review of household transmission studies of pH1N1.
Our objectives were to review the design and implementation of household studies during
the pandemic, to compare and contrast their findings and summarize the epidemiologic
characteristics of pH1N1 in households, and to identify important considerations for future
household studies of influenza transmission.
METHODS
This systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted in accordance with the Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement.11
Search strategy
Studies containing data on household transmission of the pH1N1 virus were retrieved from
the Scopus and Medline (PubMed) electronic databases on 29 June 2011. We used the
following free-text search terms in “All fields”:
#1 “influenza” OR “flu” OR “H1N1*” OR “pH1N1” OR “nH1N1” OR “vH1N1”
#2 “family” OR “household” OR “house” OR “home”
#3 “transmission” OR “infection” OR “contagion” OR “spread” OR “attack”
#4 #1 AND #2 AND #3
We limited the search to studies published after March 2009 (i.e. subsequent to the
emergence of pH1N1) through 12 December, 2011. Additional relevant studies identified by
the authors were manually retrieved from other databases.
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Study selection
All titles identified by the search strategy were independently screened by two authors
(L.L.H.L and B.J.C.). Abstracts of potentially relevant titles were then reviewed for
eligibility, and articles were selected for closer examination if a description of household
transmission was available. Eligible articles reported a household SIR for pH1N1 or
sufficient data to retrieve a SIR, and must have reported data based on ≥5 households.
Studies that followed persons only in households in which transmission occurred were also
excluded. Multiple reports of the same dataset were assessed and the most comprehensive
report of a study was included.
Ascertainment of secondary cases
Household SIRs were calculated as the number of identified cases divided by the number of
household contacts. Although not always explicitly mentioned, the estimation of SIRs as an
overall conditional risk of infection given exposure involves the following assumptions: (1)
household contacts are equally susceptible, (2) SIR is the conditional risk given exposure to
the index case(s), and is examined for a reasonable length of time following illness onset in
the index case, and (3) the SIR as defined here is a mixture of the risks of infection in
households as well as in the community, and, thus, is regarded as an overall risk of infection
among household contacts.5 Household SIRs could be estimated either through
identification of pH1N1 virus by virologic testing, by serologic evidence of infection, or
based on clinical diagnosis or self-reported signs and symptoms. Virologic methods to
confirm pH1N1 infections included reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) or viral culture on specimens collected from the respiratory tract. Serologic methods
included analysis of paired serological specimens by hemagglutination inhibition or viral
neutralization assays, with a 4-fold or greater rise between baseline and convalescence
conventionally used to indicate infection. Many studies assessed incidence of febrile acute
respiratory illness among household contacts, where the illness was a febrile upper
respiratory tract infection mostly defined as the presence of fever plus cough or sore throat
(a common surveillance definition of influenza-like illness). In some studies the definition
was extended to include the presence of fever plus one or more of the following symptoms:
coryza, shortness of breath, sneezing, rhinorrhea, sore throat, feverishness, arthralgia,
myalgia, prostration or headache. The threshold for body temperature used to classify fever
varied from 37.5°C to 38.0°C. Some studies also reported the occurrence of acute
respiratory illness among contacts where acute respiratory illness was a broad definition of
febrile or afebrile upper respiratory tract infection, typically the presence of two or more
influenza-related signs or symptoms. To distinguish the estimated SIR by various
approaches to ascertainment, we define SIRPCR, SIRFARI, and SIRARI as the SIR ascertained
by RT-PCR, febrile acute respiratory illness, and acute respiratory illness, respectively.
Data extraction
The primary data extracted were the total number of household contacts and infected
contacts according to laboratory or clinical outcome measures. Whenever available, we
extracted SIRs stratified by age group, household size and antiviral use. Children were
usually defined as those up to 15 years of age, although the age threshold in some studies
differed by one or two years. We also extracted estimated mean or median serial intervals
with 95% confidence intervals, mean household sizes, numbers of households, and index
case age distributions if they were reported. Infections identified in household contacts could
potentially be generalizable to all naturally-acquired pH1N1 infections (in contrast to, for
example, only cases presenting for outpatient medical care). Therefore, data on illness
profiles associated with pH1N1 infection were extracted from studies that confirmed
infection by laboratory testing, regardless of whether household contacts were symptomatic
or asymptomatic. All data were extracted onto a standardized form.
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Statistical analysis
SIRs were stratified according to method of ascertainment (virologic or clinical), and further
divided into adult and child age groups when data permitted. Combined estimates of the SIR
were based on proportions transformed by logit transformation12,13 and combined using a
DerSimonian-Laird random-effects model.14 We assessed statistical heterogeneity by the I2
statistic, with higher values signifying greater degree of variation.15 Meta-regression
analyses were conducted using multivariate mixed effects models,16 and missing data were
dealt with using multiple imputation. All analyses were conducted with R version 2.11.1 (R
Development Core Team, Vienna, Austria) and the metafor package.17
RESULTS
Of the 903 titles initially identified from the database search, 48 full-length articles were
assessed for inclusion, of which 21 were excluded (eTable 1 (http://links.lww.com)) and 27
studies were determined to be eligible and included in this systematic review (Figure
1).18–45 We excluded one study26 because it re-analyzed a subset of study subjects that had
been recruited in an earlier study that was already included in the analysis24; we counted
only the earlier study when we extracted serological testing results from the follow-up
study.26 One article46 reported preliminary analyses of data from the “First Few 100” study
in the United Kingdom, and the results of this study were subsequently updated in a more
comprehensive publication with a slightly larger dataset.36 We therefore excluded the
preliminary report from our systematic review and meta-analysis.
The 27 included articles are summarized in Table 1. Most studies (25/27) identified index
cases through various means (e.g. recruitment at primary health care providers, surveying
specific exposed populations such as schools and camps, follow-up of cases reported to
national public health databases, or through general practice sentinel surveillance networks)
and then followed up their households for 1–4 weeks to observe transmission. The other 2
studies recruited subjects from cohorts that had been established prior to observation of
household transmission. There was variation in the definition of household and household
members or contacts used among the studies that explicitly defined household contacts
(eTable 2, http://links.lww.com). Some studies used a traditional definition of household
contacts (those who resided with the index), while other studies broadened the definition to
include close contacts who spent 1 or more nights in the household, or even any exposure of
at least 1 hour to the infectious index case in a household setting.
In 23 of the 27 studies (85%), all index cases were confirmed by RT-PCR, while in the other
four studies, index cases were either clinically confirmed or retrospectively identified
through symptom surveys. In (63%) 17 of these studies, households were followed up
through telephone, postal or internet surveys, while the remaining studies involved one or
more home visits. Respiratory specimens were collected for virologic testing from
household contacts in 13 of the studies (48%); and 5 collected sera from household contacts.
Four studies reported that they were able to capture household transmission from the earliest
local confirmed cases of pH1N1 in their country.18,41,46,47 Three studies utilized active
surveillance systems for recruitment,29,41,48 while seven studies recruited index cases and
their households following specific local outbreaks in schools or summer
camps.18,23,24,28,30,34,42 Most studies were conducted very early in the pandemic; twelve
studies (44%) did not recruit cases after June 2009 (eFigure 1, http://links.lww.com). Only
7% (2/27) of studies were published before January 2010.
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Secondary Infection Risks
Twelve studies collected respiratory specimens from symptomatic or asymptomatic
household contacts (or both) for laboratory confirmation of influenza A (H1N1). These
studies reported SIRPCR which ranged from 3 to 38%, with a I2 of 96.5%, indicating
substantial heterogeneity (Figure 2). In 9 of the 12 studies, results were stratified by age,
yielding a range of SIRPCR from 6% to 49% [I2=91.1%] in children and 1% to 42%
(I2=96.8%) in adults. To identify potential moderators of high levels of heterogeneity
observed among studies, we conducted meta-regression analysis (Table 2). Studies that
collected respiratory specimens from all contacts reported a higher SIRPCR than studies that
swabbed only symptomatic contacts. The factors included in the model accounted for 75%
of the observed heterogeneity.
Every study included in this review reported clinical influenza among household contacts.
Most (74%; 20/27) reported SIRFARI, when the definition of infection included fever, with
point estimates ranging from 3% to 37% [I2=94.7%] (Figure 3). Age-stratified data in 16/20
studies reported SIRFARI with ranges of 4% to 43% [I2=83.7%] and 3% to 36% [I2=92.0%]
for children and adult contacts, respectively. Substantial heterogeneity in SIRFARI was
observed overall and after stratifying by age. Meta-regression analysis revealed that for
studies estimating SIRFARI, only general versus specific outbreaks (i.e. sampling from
community-wide major epidemic rather than from specific confined setting such as camp or
school clusters) yielded a substantial association with the symptomatic SIR, and the model
accounted for 34% of the heterogeneity. Among studies that aimed to collect virologic
specimens from all contacts regardless of illness, SIRFARI tended to be lower than SIRPCR
estimates for confirmed infection, whereas the reverse was true among studies that aimed to
collect virologic specimens only from contacts that reported illness (Figure 4).
Three studies reported that both SIRPCR and SIRFARI were higher among household
contacts of younger index cases,22,25,33 two studies reported that they were lower with
younger index cases,19,29 and one study found no difference by index age.41 Four studies
that stratified by sex found no difference in SIRs,27,34,40,41 while one study reported female
contacts to be at greater risk of infection24 and another that adult women were more likely to
transmit pH1N1 to children.36
Eight studies reported SIRARI, with point estimates ranging from 13% to 51% [I2=94.3%]
(eFigure 2, http://links.lww.com). Stratified analysis reported ranges of 15% to 55%
[I2=86.0%] in children and 10% to 49% [I2=90.6%] in adults.
In addition to the effects of contact and index age on household transmission, some studies
analyzed the effects of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis with oseltamivir or zanamivir,
vaccination history and household size. Eleven studies recorded infection rates among
household contacts that received antiviral prophylaxis,19,23,24,27,28,32–34,36,44,46 but only one
study reported the prophylaxis group to be more susceptible to pH1N1 (eFigure 3,
http://links.lww.com). One study reported seasonal influenza vaccination history to have no
effect on the SIR,45 while three studies24,30,35 reported elevated SIRs among people who
had been vaccinated for seasonal influenza. The SIR was variously observed to increase
with household size25,30,35,39 or not to be associated with household size.19,24,27,29,33 In one
study with a broader definition of household contacts (eTable 2, http://links.lww.com), the
SIR decreased in larger households.20
Serial intervals
Among the 27 included studies, 18 (67%) reported either the mean or median household
serial interval, including 8 that reported both (Figure 5). Mean serial intervals ranged from
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2.6 to 3.9 days while median serial intervals ranged from 2.0 to 4.0 days. Of the 26 point
estimates of the serial interval, 20 (77%) fell within the range 2.8–3.5 days.
Illness in household contacts with confirmed pH1N1 infection
The clinical signs and symptoms associated with confirmed pH1N1 infection among
household contacts are summarized in Table 3 from three studies that collected respiratory
specimens from household contacts regardless of reported illness. Cough was the most
commonly reported symptom, while fever was reported in approximately 60% of the
confirmed cases. Two studies reported asymptomatic fractions among virologically
confirmed cases to be 11% and 7%,22,3535,41 and when cases under antiviral prophylaxis
were included, the asymptomatic fraction was 20%.41 One study reported a subclinical
fraction (9%),22 and the other study similarly reported that 9% of household contacts with
serologic evidence of infection remained asymptomatic.35 One study that reported only
serological data found a crude asymptomatic fraction of 25%.26 Two studies reported the
proportion of household contacts with various clinical signs, symptoms and syndromes that
were confirmed with pH1N1 (eTable 3, http://links.lww.com).
Serologic findings
Serologic data on household contacts were available from five studies.21,22,26,35,40 Two
studies reported SIRs based solely on serology to be 20% and 27%.21,26 In addition to using
of serology to identify asymptomatic infections,35 two studies used serology and RT-PCR
results in combination to estimate pH1N1 SIRs.35,40 One study reported no evidence of a
protective effect for subjects with elevated baseline antibody titer levels against RT-PCR-
confirmed infection.22
DISCUSSION
During the 2009 pandemic, household studies were conducted in many countries to improve
understanding of the epidemiologic characteristics of the novel pH1N1 virus in a specific
community setting. We described the design of household transmission studies conducted
during the pandemic, and we compared the findings of the studies, including the household
SIR, the household serial interval, and the symptom profiles and the asymptomatic fraction
in household contacts. Among these, the SIR and household serial interval are relatively
imprecise in that they are influenced by transmissions both in household and community
settings, as well as pre-existing immunity among contacts. We therefore conducted meta-
regression analysis to identify potential factors associated with higher or lower household
SIRs (Table 2).
There were substantial heterogeneities in estimated SIRs from the various studies, with point
estimates of the SIR based on RT-PCR-confirmed secondary cases ranging from 3% to 38%
(Figure 2). Estimates were similarly heterogeneous when based on febrile acute respiratory
illness (Figure 3) and acute respiratory illness (eFigure 2, http://links.lww.com). The
intrinsic transmissibility of the pH1N1 virus is not thought to have varied substantially in
different countries; indeed, a recent review identified similarity in the estimates of the
reproduction number from a range of studies.9 A review of serologic studies also found
similar estimates of cumulative incidence of infection over the first pH1N1 wave in several
countries.49
A number of factors may have led to the observed differences in estimated household SIRs.
Meta-regression analyses revealed that rigorous case ascertainment with RT-PCR testing for
all contacts (including asymptomatic contacts), elevated the SIRPCR, whereas the SIRFARI
was unaffected (Table 2, Figure 4). Although rigorous testing undoubtedly increases the
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cost, our results indicate that studies that tested all household contacts by RT-PCR,
regardless of illness, identified more infections. Studies that test only symptomatic contacts
will not identify all infected contacts, nor will they achieve a timely collection of specimens
within 3 days of onset (when RT-PCR sensitivity is highest50). It might be expected that
studies with longer durations of follow-up would pick up not only those transmissions
within households but also those from the community; our findings were consistent with
increases in SIRPCR and SIRFARI with longer follow-up.
The highest SIRs were observed in Chile,37 Australia,29 and Canada.35,39 Among these, two
studies with differing SIRs (estimated SIRPCR of 33% and 15%) were reported from
Victoria, Australia at similar times.29,44 The study with the larger SIR estimate recruited
subjects by 31 August 2009 while the other ended on 3 June 2009; the proportion of child
index cases (aged ≥5 years) was 86% in the study with SIRPCR =15%, compared with 37%
in the other study. These are consistent with our findings from meta-regression (Table 2);
the smaller SIRPCR in studies with a greater proportion of child index cases may also
suggest case ascertainment bias. The Chilean and Canadian studies enrolled households
during peak periods of pH1N1 activity, and household contacts were followed up for 2
weeks37,39 and 3–4 weeks,35 potentially increasing the risk of misclassifying infections from
the community or household tertiary cases as household secondary cases.
In comparison, studies that report inter-pandemic influenza transmission in households have
also reported widely varying SIRs, from 7% to 31%.22,47,51–55 It is likely that factors that
led to the significant variation and heterogeneity among the studies in this review of the SIR
of pH1N1 also affected the SIR of inter-pandemic influenza. Only three studies directly
compared the household transmission of inter-pandemic and pandemic influenza
concurrently during a single season in a single population, and each reported comparable
SIRs between inter-pandemic and pandemic strains.22,31,40 One study that was excluded
from our review also reported similar secondary-infection risks for inter-pandemic and
pandemic influenza based on serologic evidence from a cohort study in 2008–2009,
explicitly estimating the risks of infections directly caused by household index cases.56 The
variations in SIRs for both pH1N1 and inter-pandemic influenza highlight a critical need to
formulate guidelines for conducting household studies of influenza so that we can gain more
explicit insights into the natural history as well as the transmission within households.
Household serial interval estimates were reported in 18 of the 27 studies (67%) included in
our review, with most point estimates falling in the range 2.8–3.5 days (Figure 5).
Correction for multiple chains of transmission (e.g. tertiary cases) could reduce serial
interval estimates, and shorten the estimated mean to 2.5 days.9 The household serial
interval is not a biological constant but instead reflects a combination of the infectivity
profile of index cases, contact patterns within households, transmission dynamics in the
community, and incubation period -- and these may vary in different settings and by
individual characteristics such as age.57–59 Although estimates of the household serial
interval have been used to infer the reproduction number from exponential growth rate of
cases,60 further studies are needed to estimate the serial interval in various settings. For
example, one recent study in the United States estimated that the serial interval of pH1N1 in
schools had a mean of just 1.1 days.57
Some household studies permitted estimation of the fraction of virologically confirmed
pH1N1 infections with asymptomatic illness at 7–11%, and the profile of signs and
symptoms associated with pH1N1 infection (Table 3). Estimation of the asymptomatic
fraction was achieved by studies that collected specimens from contacts regardless of the
presence or absence of symptoms.22,35,40,41,43 Only 5 of the 27 studies included in this
review reported serologic data.21,22,26,35,40 The inclusion of serology can provide additional
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information on asymptomatic infections, as well as on the degree of protection associated
with higher baseline humoral antibody titers. There is currently no consensus on the
definition of asymptomatic infections versus subclinical infections. The proportion of
pH1N1 infections associated with afebrile illness could be a reasonable definition of the
subclinical fraction, with estimates ranging from 33% to 47% (Table 3). Only a small
fraction of confirmed infections were completely asymptomatic. 22,26,35,41
Two major technical problems have yet to be solved regarding the analysis of data from
household transmission studies. The first is the unobservable nature of infection events. In
many studies, household follow-up was truncated at 7–9 days after illness onset of the index
case, after which little primary household transmission occurs.61 Although not explicitly
mentioned, the cut-off point should be set at a reasonable length to exclude tertiary cases
and those acquiring infection in the community (based on the right tail of the serial interval
distribution). Except for one study,20 the reviewed studies did not explicitly address
decomposition of secondary, tertiary and community infections when estimating the SIR.
However, two other studies used viral sequencing to confirm homology between the strains
infecting the index cases and corresponding secondary cases in households.35,62 Given that
the larger SIRs and longer mean serial interval in some studies35,37 are suggestive of the
presence of chains of transmission or community infections and consequent overestimation
of the SIR, it is important to try to identify transmissions that occur only within households.
Whereas several statistical methods are available to address this point at least partially
(using either SIR stratified by household size or observed serial interval distribution59,63),
those datasets were unfortunately fairly scarce, and irregular timing of observation during
the course of an epidemic has made it difficult to remove the co-primary cases from the
observed serial intervals. Furthermore, considering the dependent nature of household and
community infection risks,64 we refrained from imposing strong epidemiologic assumptions
to build a simplistic statistical model, and also from decomposing the observed data into
those attributable to transmissions in the household and community. To address these issues,
influence of household study characteristics on the estimate of SIR (including the length of
follow-up and the timing of observation) were examined instead, demonstrating that the
study design -- most notably case ascertainment -- was an important source of heterogeneity
(Table 2). In particular, our meta-analysis has demonstrated that household studies can
provide invaluable data on influenza infection; in studies that used febrile illness reports, the
resulting estimates of the SIR could underestimate the true SIR (Figure 4) because a
substantial fraction of influenza infections are not associated with febrile illness (Table 3).
The second technical problem is the lack of an ideal approach to recruitment and follow-up
of households during the course of an epidemic. Studies conducted during the early stages of
the pandemic can provide timely estimates of epidemiologic characteristics such as the SIR
and serial interval, but the community risk of infection varies throughout the course of the
epidemic, and the risk of infection within the household could be influenced by many factors
such as changing contact behavior upon diagnosis. In one study, households recruited were
quarantined and advised to remain at home; in such situations there could be a higher degree
of household contact leading to elevated SIRs.29 However, sampling households only
around the peak period of the pandemic could lead to confusion of community infections as
secondary cases from within the household, as well as to inclusion of some contacts that
have already been infected and are immune. Furthermore, the sources and characteristics of
index cases may affect subsequent transmission dynamics as discussed above. All these
reservations likely apply equally to household studies of inter-pandemic influenza in
households.
Based on our review, we have formulated some recommendations for household
transmission study protocols for future studies of pandemic as well as inter-pandemic
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influenza. First, while many studies were conducted within a few months of the initial
World Health Organization global pandemic alert in April 2009, other studies were delayed
by requirements for protocol development, ethical approval, and funding. Some of the
earliest studies were conducted as part of containment measures or routine public health
investigations, and these studies often had the most haphazard approaches to recruitment and
follow-up of households. The First Few 100 study conducted in the United Kingdom36
provides an excellent model of a household transmission study that was prepared in advance
of the pandemic with a detailed protocol, relevant approvals, and funding in place before the
pandemic.
Second, laboratory outcome measures are preferable in community-based studies of
influenza because many other co-circulating pathogens are associated with upper respiratory
tract infections.65 Febrile acute respiratory infections among contacts provided fairly
specific criteria for confirmed pH1N1 infection, and estimates based on febrile acute
respiratory infections could be corrected for the fraction of infections developing such
illness to provide more reasonable estimates of the SIR. Given the technical issue discussed
above regarding the direct interpretation of point estimates of overall SIRs, as well we the
heterogeneity reported in our meta-analysis (Figures 2 and 3), the most important
information provided by household transmission studies may be on differences in infectivity
and susceptibility by age, and the effects of specific interventions such as antiviral use.
Household SIRs have been used to provide these estimates in the literature because the
exposure of household contacts to a single index case permits fairly straightforward
analysis.66
Third, it must be remembered that the household SIR is theoretically defined to reflect the
risk of infection among “susceptible” contacts,5 while many older adults are likely to have
been partially or fully immune to pH1N1.67 Inclusion of serology in household studies could
provide information on humoral immunity. With adequate laboratory capacity, other
correlates of protection, such as cell-mediated and mucosal immunity can be assessed
through collection of whole blood and nasal washes..
Finally, there was considerable uncertainty in the early stages of the pandemic regarding the
fraction of infections that were asymptomatic or subclinical. Along with well-designed
prospective symptom diaries, collection of acute and convalescent serology from household
contacts in household transmission studies could provide key information on asymptomatic
cases, which is essential to interpreting epidemic curves of symptomatic cases and
forecasting the course of the pandemic. One potential limiting factor, however, is the
availability of validated serologic assays early in the next pandemic.
Household transmission studies can provide important information on influenza
epidemiology. However our review suggests that interpretation and comparison of estimates
of the SIR from individual studies are substantially affected by differential diagnostic
methods and case ascertainment. Furthermore, the unbiased risk of household secondary
infection is only approximated by the crude household SIR, and it remains technically
challenging to estimate the fraction of secondary cases that were directly infected by the
index case. By building a consensus on the appropriate approaches to studying transmission
in households (via, for example, common survey protocols), it is likely that household
transmission studies could be greatly improved and provide valuable insights into the
epidemiology of pandemic and inter-pandemic influenza.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1.
Flow diagram of study selection.
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Figure 2.
Secondary infection risks (SIRPCR) of laboratory-confirmed infection by RT-PCR among
household contacts.
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Figure 3.
Secondary infection risks (SIRFARI) according to report of febrile acute respiratory infection
among household contacts.
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Figure 4.
Estimates of the SIRPCR and SIRFARI in 5 studies that aimed to collect respiratory
specimens from all household contacts, and 6 studies that aimed to collect respiratory
specimens only from ill contacts.
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Figure 5.
Point estimates of the mean and median household serial intervals in 16 studies.
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Table 2
Meta-regression analysis of variables that could influence the secondary infection risk (SIR)
Confirmed by RT-PCR (n=12)a Febrile acute respiratory illness (FARI) (n=20)b
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Contacts tested by RT-PCR
 All c 1.00 1.00
 Only symptomatic 0.28 (0.11–0.74)* 0.99 (0.44–2.22)
No. index cases per householdc,d
 Multiple 1.00 1.00
 One 0.26 (0.07–1.00) 0.74 (0.32–1.70)
Duration of follow up
 ≤8 daysc 1.00 1.00
 >8 days 1.75 (0.48–6.33) 1.47 (0.74–2.92)
Type of outbreakc
 General 1.00 1.00
 Single sourcee 1.99 (0.63–6.36) 0.34 (0.16–0.74)*
Percent of index cases who were childrenc
 ≤50% 1.00 1.00
 >50% 0.49 (0.10–2.40) 0.61 (0.29–1.30)
Percent of household contacts who were childrenc
 ≤30% 1.00 1.00
 >30% 0.86 (0.32–2.35) 1.35 (0.65–2.80)
aSIR confirmed by RT-PCR: original τ2: 1.0756, meta-regression τ2: 0.2667, 75.2% of original heterogeneity explained
bSIR estimated by FARI: original τ2: 0.2811, meta-regression τ2: 0.1856, 34.0% of original heterogeneity explained
c
Reference category
dStudies in which it would have been possible for more than one person in a household to be identified as index case (i.e. identification of potential
co-primary cases).
eSingle-source outbreak denotes studies which followed a specific outbreak e.g. summer camps or schools.
τ2 is the moment-based estimate of the between-studies variance.
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Table 3
Signs and symptoms reported by household contacts with confirmed influenza in studies where respiratory
specimens were collected from household contacts regardless of illness
Cowling 201022(n=9)
No. (%)
Papenburg 201035(n=45)
No. (%)
Suess 201041(n=15)
No. (%)
Cough 8 (88.9) 38 (84.4) 10 (66.7)
Fever 5 (55.6) 30 (66.7) 8 (53.3)
Sore throat 6 (66.7) -- 3 (20.0)
Headache 4 (44.4) -- 4 (26.7)
Myalgia 3 (33.3) -- 4 (26.7)
Diarrhoea -- 11 (24.4) --
Nausea -- 7 (15.6) --
Runny nose 4 (44.4) -- --
Asymptomatic 1 (11.1) 3 (6.7) 3 (20.0)
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